The administration of the Safe Deposit Department in the Broad Street Head Office was managed by a Custodian whose responsibilities included all aspects of the day-to-day operation of the facility. Over the period from 1933 (when the facility was inaugurated) to 1979 (the end date of the history covered by this website) the Custodians included Bill Buxton (from 1938); E H Viney (from April 1st 1943 to June 30th 1945); A F Lambeth (from July 1st 1945 to August 18th 1947); H E Martin (from August 19th 1947); Reginald Clamp, Eric Hannan, and  Norman Monk (from June 1st 1976).

 

The Custodian's daily responsibilities began with the opening of the Safe Deposit strongroom door (photo 1). This door was secured with two combination locks: one controlled by the Custodian and the other by the Bank's Chief Accountant. In addition to opening the main strongroom door, through which renters gained access to their safes, these two officers also opened a smaller door at the rear of Safe Deposit. Once this small door was opened, the approximately fifty-foot-square strongroom was linked to a ventilation system that changed the air four times an hour. All four combinations were based on three letters; the combinations were changed periodically, and were also changed whenever responsibility for them was handed over, eg at a period of holiday relief. Copies of the combination letters currently in use were held in sealed envelopes in the safes of the General Manager and his Deputy. The door also featured a time lock, but this additional security feature does not seem to have been used on a routine basis.

 

Access by renters to their safes was allowed during normal banking hours. Renters descended to the basement level facility by stairs off the front corridor of the Broad Street entrance, or by a lift in the same area. Locked bronze gates controlled access to the immediate Safe Deposit area (photo 4), and renters rang a bell-push attached to the gate to indicate their arrival. The renter was granted access by a member of the Safe Deposit staff (usually a uniformed commissionaire) unlocking the gate - no verification was made of the renter's identity at this point, but this was done shortly afterwards, once a Request for Access form had been completed.

 

Safes were rented in sole or joint names, the applicants completing a Safe Deposit Agreement, which amongst other conditions of the rental, listed items which should not be placed within the safe (eg dangerous or obnoxious materials). However, the renter was able to place, inspect, and remove objects from their designated safe in privacy, making supervision of the contents impracticable. Upon completing an Agreement, the renter(s) provided signatures on a Rental Card, and were then issued with two duplicate keys to their new safe. The Rental Card contained the name and address of the renter, plus a section where the payment of the annual rental was recorded. This comprehensive card replaced an earlier Information Relating to the Renter form.

 

When a Request for Access form was completed (either by a renter, or a pre-authorised representative of the renter), the applicant's signature was verified against the specimen held, a check was made to ensure the safe's rental had been paid up to date, and access to the safe duly authorised. The Request for Access form was time-stamped and held pending the renter's departure. Each individual safe was controlled by two locks: one lock unique to that safe, the second (control or pass) lock being common to all 10,528 safes. Following authorisation of an access application, a member of staff conducted the renter to the appropriate safe and turned the control lock. The renter was then left to open his or her own safe with his or her own key. Inspection of the safe's contents could be made on pullout shelves located in the Safe Deposit walls, at a table within the facility, or in a private room (photo 2) outside the strongroom area.

 

Over 85% of the 10,528 safes were the smallest size, with a height of 3¼" and a width of less than 6". This small frontage, combined with a depth of 19", made access to the safe's contents difficult where the safe was full with a large number of small items. In such cases, the renter could purchase a purpose-built box (photo 8) that filled the entire safe; it enabled the contents to be removed for inspection in a more convenient manner.

 

Renters were allowed unlimited access to their rented safe, within normal banking hours. In practice, many renters just used their safe to store documents such as wills, property deeds, investment certificates, etc and made infrequent inspections of the contents. On surrendering a safe, the renter was required to remove all the contents, and return both the keys that were originally issued. After verifying that the safe was empty, a member of staff then cancelled the Safe Deposit Agreement.

 

Where a renter lost keys, it was necessary for the Bank to acquire duplicates from the safe manufacturer: Chubb & Son's Lock & Safe Co., Ltd. A charge to cover the cost of the replacement keys, plus administration costs, was made to the renter. Each key bore an identification number (photos 5 & 6) that linked it to its corresponding lock mechanism (photo 7) , enabling Chubb to produce the replacement keys. In the cases of both a lost key for a continuing rental, and where a safe was being surrendered, it was the Bank's practice to change the locks. This practice was a basic security measure to prevent a 'lost' key, or an unauthorised duplicate key for a surrendered safe, continuing to be linked to a safe known to a renter. The key's identification number was never the same as the safe's number (photo 11) , to which it had been allocated.

 

The ordering and issuing of duplicate keys was conducted within strict security rules, the replacement keys from Chubb being delivered directly to the Bank's Deputy General Manager, in individually wax-sealed envelopes (photos 9 & 10). The Deputy General Manager held the replacement keys under secure conditions within his own office, until they were issued to the renter.

 

Generally, the annual safe rental charge was paid automatically by Standing Order from the renter's BMB account. This arrangement did not apply, however, where the renter did not have a BMB account, or chose to pay in cash. In these latter cases, it was necessary for the Safe Deposit staff to send an annual letter requesting payment. These request letters were sent out on a daily basis - the staff in the Safe Deposit Department extracting the appropriate Rental Cards (which were filed in safe number order) by reference to index cards that were filed in rental due date order. Payments made at a branch, either by Standing Order or by cash, were advised to Safe Deposit via the Bank's Clearing Department, in order that the Rental Card could be updated.

 

In addition to the above routine matters, the Custodian was also responsible for some potentially complex situations, such as the death of a renter. Disposal of the safe's contents could only be made to the deceased's legal representative as stipulated in a Probate of Will or Letters of Administration. However, in the case of Probate, it was likely that the renter's Will was being held in his safe - the Custodian would therefore release a Will to the executor on production of suitable proof of identity. The only other item that could be released from a safe prior to obtaining Probate was a deed for a burial plot, thus enabling the deceased's funeral to proceed.

 

The renter's entitlement that only he or she (or an authorised representative) be granted access to their safe was strictly enforced. The presentation of a safe key, together with a heart-rending story of some family crisis, was insufficient reason for this right to security and privacy being dishonoured. On very rare occasions, the police would present a court order to gain access to a particular safe, eg where keys had been found in the possession of a suspect charged with a serious offence. In an isolated case, opening a safe on such a court order led to the discovery of a handgun - one of the items that renters were not allowed to place in a safe.

 

Most renters paid only short visits when accessing their safe, merely adding or removing items. However, detailed inspections of the contents of a larger safe could take some time, but there was no time limits set for access, provided the renter did not wish to stay beyond the day's closing time. After completing an access visit to a safe, it was the renter's responsibility to close and lock the safe - this action secured both locks. There were no formalities on the renter's departure, other than opening the access gate and time-stamping the Request for Access form. However, at close of business, the Custodian would make an inspection in order to ascertain that all the individual safe doors were closed - a glance across the faces of the blocks of safes being sufficient to spot the abnormality of a door not properly secured. In the rare instances where a safe was found insecure, the contents would be placed in the Bank's own secure facility, under dual control. A similar procedure was required where a rental was unpaid, and the renter had not responded to requests to attend at the Bank; a strictly controlled security protocol was followed to obtain duplicate keys to enable the safe to be opened, any contents placed under dual control, the lock changed, and the safe made available for renting once more.

 

Each day's Request for Access forms were filed, after being counted to help compile the annual statistic of number of accesses granted. Until the late 1960s, the file of Request for Access forms was the only record of when a particular safe was accessed. Following a customer complaint that centred on the dates a particular safe was accessed, the above system was augmented by each renter's Rental Card being date-stamped on each day the safe was visited.

 

In addition to the provision of private safe facilities, the Safe Deposit also allowed customers to place large deed boxes or parcels (under seal of the owner) in safe custody. Such items were deposited in one of the two separate secure areas at the rear of the Safe Deposit. This area was also utilised when the Bank offered a Safe Deposit Packet facility, which was introduced when all the individual safes were rented. The Safe Deposit Packet system allowed items to be deposited in sealed packets, which were not available for inspection, but only on a deposit and withdrawal basis - a less flexible service than an individual safe, but at a lower annual fee.

 

One infrequent task for the Safe Deposit Custodian was the requirement to write to each individual renter when there was an increase in the annual rent, a renter being entitled to a month's written notice of such an amendment to the Rental Agreement. Such an exercise inevitably led to an increase in the number of safe surrenders - not usually because of the rental increase (which were always modest), but because many renters were reminded that they no longer had a use for a safe.

 

The surrender of a safe generated a specific security routine: a lock change. Periodically, more frequently when there was a high demand for safes, the Bank's engineer removed the lock mechanism from a number of vacant safes and switched them round. Thus, each new renter for a specific safe received a pair of keys to a safe that had not had that lock mechanism previously.

 

Peaks of safe access activity were generally related to specific external events. A change in the design of Bank Notes would result in renters removing Notes being taken out of circulation, taking them upstairs to the Banking Hall to be changed for the replacement Bank Notes, which were then placed into the security of the Safe Deposit. The maturity of investments, such as National Savings Certificates or Government Securities, would also generate extra accesses.

 

After the close of business for the day, the Custodian's final responsibility was the closure of the main, and rear ventilation, strongroom doors. The main door had an inner grille door (photo 3) that was closed and locked; a wooden shelf that covered the door threshold was removed; and the massive safe door was swung into the closed position - despite its 8½-ton weight, the door could be moved with a single finger. The key to the grille, together with the safe pass keys, were placed in the Deputy General Manager's safe overnight.

 

Closure of the watertight door sealed a strongroom that basically consisted of a box that was bounded on all six sides by concrete that was two-feet-thick and reinforced with steel - the ceiling alone weighing 460 tons. Moreover, the box was effectively an island site, surrounded by corridors with mirrors positioned to enable the building's resident caretaker to verify the integrity of the walls, during night time inspections, at a glance. The caretaker's nightly security patrols were recorded by him activating a number of key-operated devices, placed strategically around Head Office, that recorded the time of his checks on a monitor within the building's telephone exchange.

 

Thus the Safe Deposit facility was safe from fire, burglary, and flood - the sloping site on Broad Street ensuring that water entering the building at the front, would flow out at the rear, bypassing the watertight facility. The renters' safe contents would therefore remain secure and unavailable to access until the Custodian, once more, swung open the massive strongroom door.